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   THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
   The Problem of Constitutional Change through the Introduction of 
      New Overruling Law in a System of Constitutional Principle 
                   Roger MICHENER* 
I 
   The Constitution of the United States of America was ratified nearly two 
hundred years ago. lt grew from the failure of government and was largely a 
recreation of the past. 
   Following independence from Great Britain the former colonies estab-
lished a confederated government that had the immediate and principal 
shortcoming of not being able to establish and to coordinate a national 
policy. The Articles of Confederation were noted for their inability to treat 
with other govemments, to provide for a common defense, and to regulate 
exchanges among the various states. The new nation was confronted with 
the problem of sovereignty. The need to present a common front to other 
national, states; the need to establish a legitimate central authority for 
coordinating and regulating the activities between the various state jurisdic-
tions; and the need to superimpose national standards for exchange - the 
monetary and postal systems - were chief among the reasons that called 
the constitutional convention to Philadelphia. 
   The document hat emerged was a constitution that provided solution, 
or at least amelioration, for the problems of national government. What the 
Articles of Confederation could not provide the new constitution did; and 
it did so by recreating in large measure the structure of English government 
as it had emerged just prior to the Hanoverian Succession and by stating 
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that the new government which it created could not deviate from the struc-
ture imposed by the Constitution.. The new constitution established a 
government of national policy that guaranteed individual rights by seeking to 
ground all actions of the government in certain principles that would secure 
those rights. 
   The influence of the early documents of modern constitutional govern-
ment that emerged from seventeenth century England - the Petition of 
Right, the Declaration of Right, the Habeus Corpus Act and the Act of Set-
tlement, to mention the most famous - is so strong in the American Con-
stitution that much of the language is roughly similar to them. Woven into 
these rights were philosophical and political doctrines whose purpose it was 
to provide the practical, political foundation for the defense of these rights. 
The philosophical doctrines were those primarily associated with John Locke 
an natural law and natural right. The political doctrines were those associat-
ed with the "ancient constitution" that sought to secure the rights of 
Englishmen that had existed "time out of mind" and held in place by provi-
sion of citizenship that identified the exercise of political right with the 
ownership of real property. There were other influences and components as 
well, of course, in the construction of the new constitution, but these were 
the most important ones. The central feature was the doctrine of political 
association that linked political right to the ownership of real property. In 
turn, the political power that derived from property secured the free exercise 
of political right. 
  The Legitimation for this arrangement, an arrangement o be secured by 
government in which there was Separation and Balance of power, came 
from the past. Or to put it better, the Legitimation came from a denial of 
time itself. The rights guaranteed by the Constitution and practically pro-
tected by the power derived from property ownership were held to have 
always existed from "time out of mind" and were thus thought to be pro-
tected from subsequent challenge. Something fashioned yesterday could be 
easily brought into question by something "better" tomorrow, but some-
thing that had always existed beyond memory and out of time could be 
secure from the challenge of reform or the danger of abrogation. 
  Thus, the American Constitution is constructed of political and philo-
sophical principles that claim political legitimacy not only by philosophical 
persuasion but also - and principally, 1 think - by their political assertion
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to have always existed, fixed and unwavering. Since principles are under-
stood to be fixed and constant, and since the theory of the origin of rights 
embodied in the Constitution claims its legitimacy from a past beyond 
memory that always was, it is probably accurate to describe both English 
and American constitutional law as "conservative." It claims to be good law 
because it is an eternal law derived from principles that are valid because 
they are eternal; all modification of existing legal arrangements is done in 
the narre of the past through a "re-affirmation of the past" in that change 
represents a closer approximation in the management of human affairs to the 
propositions embodied in the fixed principle. In other words, new reforming 
legislation of tomorrow is better than the governing legislation of today only 
if it can get "closer" to the principles of the past. In this view, new law does 
not so much spring from the past as it is a return to the past. But new law, of 
course, is new law; and an examination of the process by which new law is 
made through the actions of courts and legislatures shows that this view, per-
haps, is not the entire truth. Part of the truth, nevertheless, rests an the view 
that the introduction of new law into the American constitutional System 
depends an the past. To assert this view may also be to assert a paradox. 
   A similar paradox can be found in the history of Roman law. Some 
Roman lawyers held that the law of Rome from the time of the Twelve 
Tables of the Law to the growth of authoritative interpretation in the 
Dominate had remained faithful to the original structure of the law, even 
though every stone in the building of the law had been changed. This view, 
of course, was not true in Rome any more than it is fully true in American 
law, but it is the expression of a theory of political legitimacy that secures 
new law by identifying new law with the good, old law. lt is a theory that 
has great practical power. 
                      II 
  If, then, the law of the American Constitution and its subsequent inter-
pretation is a law of principles, the question may be properly asked, "What 
are they?" What are the principles that claim to be fixed in the past that 
simultaneously permit the elaboration of new law according to the scheme 
of government and the pattern of rights stipulated in the Constitution? 
   Constitutional scholars have at various times identified and pointed to
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many principles in the constitutional order, but, according to my under-
standing there are three which are most important, under which the others 
may be contained or subsumed. 
   These are: 
   1. the principle of liberty, individual and corporate; 
   2. the principle of the fundamental equality in moral dignity of all 
      citizens in the society; 
   3. the principle of the supremacy of law - the rule of law. 
These principles drive legislation, administrative enactments, and constitu-
tional interpretation in modern American government; they have done so for 
a long time, even though they have been given different meanings and diff-
ferent emphasises over the course of the past two hundred years. A principal 
reason for the development of a government of public policy from an earlier 
one of national policy has been the extension of these principles in legisla-
tion and in judicial decision. 1 shall return to this theme somewhat later, 
but by "national" policy 1 wish to designate an earlier form of American 
government in which laws were formed primarily an the basis of political 
considerations and by "public policy" a later form in which laws have been 
formed not only an political considerations, but also an economic and social 
ones as well. 
   One way to understand these principles and the effect of their various 
interpretations an policy is to consider them as part of a constellation; they 
work together because together they form a pattern of government. But 
they do not always co-exist happily. Even though in their nature as ideal 
principles they may be harmonious, in their practical aspirations they are at 
odds with one another in their complete fulfillment or realization. In their 
partial fulfillment, they are often capable of effective collaboration and 
worthwhile co-operation. This collaboration and co-operation when it 
occurs, is a product of good judgment and good fortune - the product of 
statesmanlike actions that have reconciled larger disjunctive political forces. 
From time to time they are achieved. 
   At other times, however, when one of these principles seeks to "fulfill" 
itself, to achieve complete expression in practical policy, it does so at the 
expense of the others and can create an unhappy imbalance in the constitu-
tional structure. Equally, the Subordination of one principle to another, the
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"stunting" or "harnessing" of one and forcing it
, thereby, into collaboration 
with others represents a compromise of that principle, which is repugnant to 
its aspirations, and makes it impure and unsatisfactory. It follows from this 
subordination that the entire constellation is called into question and 
becomes the object of revision through political action. Even so, despite the 
inability of this constellation of constitutional principles to form a constant 
harmony, there is no element of policy that proclaims or asserts itself to be 
in Opposition to these principles or divergent from them. 
   According to this view there exist some inherent antinomies not only in 
the simultaneous expression of constitutional principles, because of the com-
petition among them, but also within the principle itself. For example, with 
respect to the first principle, it is easy to recognize that the exercise of free-
dom by corporations could limit the exercise of freedom by individuals. It 
has been said by many people that the exercise of the freedom of contract 
over a period of time has resulted in inequality of bargaining power between 
corporations and individuals, favoring the freedom of corporations. With 
respect to the second principle, once the proposition of equality of moral 
dignity is given a specific content - such as, for instance, "a basic standard 
of living" - that conjoins to any degree at all economic, social, and politi-
cal meanings the aspiration of equality is called into doubt as the realities of 
inequality are better understood. Similarly, any attempt to diminish social 
or economic inequality through legislative reform can only be done by 
imposing inequality an those whose status or wealth is to be distributed. 
The correction of inequality in the narre of equality is inequality. 1 am 
not certain this has always to be so, but it is hard to think of an excep-
tion to it in modern legislation. Perhaps one of the most difficult problems 
for contemporary government is a proper and complete understanding of 
equality, as an ideal and in its implications, followed by an application of 
that understanding. Finally, the conflict between the ideals of freedom and 
equality should be mentioned. Simultaneously providing for the possibility 
of these ideals has been one of the classical dilemmas of government; and the 
usual way of resolving the conflict by political thinkers has been to define 
one ideal - whichever is favored by a particular writer - in terms of the 
other and thereby to extinguish the conflict. The intention of such defini-
tions is to have one ideal "revealed" or "fulfilled" by the other. But in the
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world of practical politics the solution, much less the ruminations of politi-
cal and legal philosophy, have not been entirely helpful in resolving the con-
flict between these ideals - a conflict that arises from the antimony bet-
ween them. 
   Nonetheless, the actions of constitutional government in the United 
States in the original formation of a national policy may be described, 
according to this model, as the precipitate of the collaborative tension of 
these ideals. The policy of government could be said to be an implementa-
tion of the compromise of these principles, if for no other reason than that 
there is no element of policy that proclaims opposition to these principles. 
Since it does not seem possible to have füll liberty with absolute equality at 
the Same time (insofar as it has not been achieved), but since it is also pos-
sible to have continuity in government, the compromise among these prin-
ciples, when viewed as a whole, may appear as harmonious with the third 
principle of the rule of law acting as a governor. But what appears to be a 
harmony of compromise of the whole, when viewed from the postion of one 
principle in competition with others, appears as a conflict; and where the 
regulatory principle of the rule of law is disturbed so, too, the harmonious 
arrangement may dissolve. 
   Indeed, the harmony of this arrangement and the worthwhileness of it 
have been more recently brought into question than may have been true in 
the past. The Constitution was constructed as a political document, for the 
conduct of a national policy that was devoid of such economic and social 
legislation as today characterizes modern welfare states. There are, certainly, 
contrary interpretations, but, minimally, the economic and social orders 
encased by the political order established by the Constitution were not the 
economic and social orders that presently characterize modern society. 
   There has been, then, a conversion in the United Statesdating mainly 
from the New Deal but having definite roots in earlier actions of govern-
ment, of which the early regulation of monopoly, the growth and legal pro-
tection of organized labor, and the administration of a national tax an in-
comes must be reckoned as important, from a government of national policy 
to one of public policy. The distinction between these two types of policy is 
helpful in understanding the new kind of public law that has grown in the 
United States since the reconception of the role of government that was 
institutionalized in New Deal legislation as well as by the administrative
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actions of the Executive Branch, an institutionalization that marked a self-
conscious change of belief about the rightful role of government. 
   This newer form of the actions of government - public policy -
is the precipitate of the collaborative tension of these principles, subjected 
to changing interpretation. 
   One of the questions before us, is whether the effects resulting from 
changed interpretations alter or undercut the principles (and the collabora-
tion of them) an which the constitutional government is based and from 
which the newer interpretations about the rightful actions of government 
are derived. 
                      III 
   Ultimately, the legitimacy and meaning of new law in the United States 
rests an the interpretation of the Constitution by the constitutional court 
- Supreme Court. The new law that has enabled government to create 
new patterns of legal actions that have so changed the public order from 
what it was is largely the result of change in constitutional interpretation. 
   This constitutional interpretation, however, is different from what 
is usually understood as Common Law interpretation in which courts act 
in some measure with regard to precedent according to a legal principle. 
The new public constitutional law is too different from the old law to 
admit a fully progressive interpretation of old law as the Basis of it, even 
though Common Law interpretation has played a large rote in bringing 
about that change.1) 
    1) Perhaps the best account of "Common Law interpretation" may be found in Edward H. 
Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949). "There-
fore, it appears that the kind of reasoning i volved in the legal process i  one in which the classifi-
cation changes a the classification s made," p. 3. "The emphasis hould be an the process .... 
Legal reasoning has a logic of its own. Its structure fits it to give meaning to ambiguity and to test 
constantly whether the society has come to see new differences or similarities .... Nor can it be 
said that he result of such a method istoo uncertain to compel. The compulsion f the law is clear; 
the explanation s that the area of doubt is constantly set forth. The probable area of expansion r 
contraction is foreshadowed as the System works," p. 104. The problem I am working with here 
in the constitutional area owes much to Mr. Levi's formulation. But 1 am suggesting something 
different in the view that shifts in constitutional doctrine, atleast in the United States because of 
the principled basis of a written Constitution, i volve something more than interpretation by a 
"moving System ofclassification" that characterizes the interpretation of statutory law
, even though 
it is through the interpretation of statutory law that shifts in constitutional doctrine are achieved.
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   Nor has the new law come from the deliberate creation of a new system 
of legal norms. Prophets, historically, are the only persons who have taken 
a fully dismissive approach to existing law by consciously fashioning new 
law. Judges do exercise judicial restraint. Even those, who from an objec-
tive point of view have been the most creative in making new bodies of law, 
as opposed to fundamentally "new" law, saw themselves as expounders 
of existing norms and principles, bound not only to those norms but also 
to existing techniques and methods for interpreting existing law to new 
situations of fact. Despite the efforts of writers an legal questions to elevate 
judicial behavior to an independent and normative status, the most eminent 
jurists, almost without exception, adhere to the view that they are not 
consciously creating new law. Legislators, too, have regarded the con-
stitutional apparatus as subject to modification but not to fundamental 
change -- even amendments to the Constitution are regarded as extensions 
and clarifications of principles, or as corrections of them, not as introjec-
tions of new norms -- and have behaved towards it this way. That they 
believe this makes the problem of explaining fundamental change in con-
stitutional law based an fixed principle, albeit with alterable or, if you will, 
interpretable meaning, more difficult. 
   Of course, despite the subjective view of jurists and legislators, it must 
be acknowledged that the present meaning of old law comes only from 
creating new law from old, or from interpreting old law in a new way (it 
is, surely, possible to have a "new" interpretation of an old law that claims 
to be an "old" interpretation). In the case of the United States Constitution 
this may be a distinction without a difference, for the present meaning of 
the law is known by its interpretation, whether the product of "conscious" 
creation or not. The claim for legitimacy of an Interpretation rests an an 
appeal to a constitutional principle that has been transmitted from the 
past. It is very hard to avoid the conclusion that in a government of con-
stitutional principle, the possibility of creating fundamentally new law, 
or law in conflict with a principle, whether by judges or legislators, is 
practically excluded. Even the power of "judicial review", the power 
to deny the effect of new legislation if it is held to violate a Provision of a 
principle of the Constitution, is essentially the power to say "no" to the 
new because the new violates the old. 
   This view of a "conservative" law of principles has been recently con-
1985] THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 9 
fronted, however, by a number of extremely labile interpretations of the 
law by the constitutional court in the United States that has resulted in a 
number of overturned decisions. It is very difficult to reconcile a judicial 
decision that overrules a previous judicial decision with a government of 
enduring principle, especially in constitutional matters. It does not matter 
if an overruling decision is taken to be created law or merely law extended 
by legitimate interpretation of legal concepts in the light of changing Je-
mands of the public interest, for neither view can alter the fact that an 
overruling decision changes the law, calls the previous interpretation into 
question, raises the issue of remedying claims, but most important for 
the discussion here, embarrasses the principle an which the previous decision 
was based, especially in those cases where there has not been a clear demon-
stration of error for appeal. 
   There is another matter and perhaps a more important one from the 
point of view of polity, that a law that changes itself frequently calls itself, 
its usefulness and its legitimacy, into question. Indeed, in the United States 
this has happened to some degree with the result that to a degree the law 
has become politicized. But perhaps this is inevitable in the light of an 
increasing number of overruling decisions. In the first one hundred fifty 
years of the United States' history, there were very few such judicial deci-
sions. Likewise, in the field of legislation, there was what might be called 
continuity, that is, the more or less continuous application of a fixed inter-
pretation of governmental principles into legislation, according to a more 
or less fixed view of what could be expected from a practical application 
of those principles. There are, certainly, scholars who would challenge this 
assertion, but it is the nature of assertions to open themselves to challenge. 
   In contrast, in the past fifty years, although there are notable and 
important examples of a somewhat earlier date, there have been a large 
number of overruling decisions by the constitutional court. The contrast 
in the number alone, comparing the earlier period with the more recent 
one, is a matter for instruction. Some areas, such as freedom of contract, 
have required more than one subsequent decision to overrule the older one. 
This was true in the overturning of Lochner. Nothing, especially, in the 
Constitution commanded the interpretation of Lochner; nor did anything 
especially command the opposite. But it seems possible to have found 
both a view and its opposite in the same document. Could this have been
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the much talked about "original intention"? Indeed, if a view and its 
opposite co-exist, so to speak, one salient while the other is recumbent, 
why in time should they not be again reversed, why should not the old 
Lochner rule prevail again? If one view is really better than the other 
view and if the fundamental law has remained constant, why was justice 
not done in the firnt place? The Same question may be asked with respect 
to the pairing of Plessy vs. Ferguson and Brown vs. Board of Education 
(Topeka, Kansas) or with respect to the recent constitutional history of 
the validity of capital punishment. The Same question may be raised in a 
slightly different way by asking about the validity of the denial of early 
New Deal legislation by the pre-1937 Supreme Court, followed by its sub-
sequent enactment. The actions of striking down what an the face of it 
appeared to be legitimate and properly enacted legislation cannot be ex-
plained, in the face of the subsequent history, by labelling the court an 
ideological backwater. However saurian those justices may have been, 
their decisions were based an quite solid views grounded in the best prac-
tices of constitutional interpretation, and the overturning of their decisions 
by subsequent enactment does not admit of ready explanation, especially 
according to tenets of distributive justice. All of these overruled decisions 
raine the possibility of their being subsequently overruled, an eventuality 
that certainly has consequences for the system of law that permits such 
lability. 
   Still, despite the discontinuities in the law that may be seen from com-
paring overruled with overruling decisions or sharp alterations in the course 
and intent of legislation, there has remained continuity in legal development 
to the degree that there has remained much certainty about the place of 
legal institutions in the larger social order and the applications of the law, 
because the constitution that supports these arrangements provides for a 
government of principles. 
   So, the question may be raised in light of these diverging facts -
on one hand, legal phenomena that contradict themselves and cannot be 
reconciled in terms of the principles of constitutional law from which 
these phenomena are derived, and, an the other hand, the basic disposition 
in the American constitutional order for legal continuity how it is 
possible for a constitutional document to give rise to, through the manipu-
lation of it, such Swings of meaning so wide that one decision of the con-
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stitutional court may come to overrule another decision of the Same court 
(if of different membership) in a relatively short while without severing 
(and apparently without disturbing too muck) legal continuity. The premise 
here is that judicial overruling in a constitutional court must be regarded 
as one of the most serious actions in a constitutional order. 
   This is an especially perplexing question for a constitutional order 
that leaves no place for legal prophecy by virtue of its Claim to legitimacy 
through the assertion of the importance of the past; and thereby, having 
created a government of political principle that requires public policy 
to be attached to and based an a constitutional principle before new law 
can be enacted by legislatures or newly interpreted overruling law be 
proclaimed by a court. While it is possible, for example, to have a law 
in the American government that is palpably not in the public interest 
in its effect, it is not possible for a public law to say it will serve only a 
private interest. Even the most outrageous favoring, "pork-barrel" legislation 
proclaims that it serves a public interest - as it might well: for it to do 
otherwise would violate a convention of the constitution. Still, we are 
confronted with a peculiar constitutional arrangement that has - and 
increasingly so - provided, even stimulated, its opposite result and bears, 
significantly, the possibility of a return to a rule similar to the first, sub-
sequently overruled, formulation -- why should one not be followed by 
another? - through judicial overrulings and divergences in legislation, 
but all held within the framework of a continuing order. 
   To understand this curious result in modern American constitutional 
law means to suggest an explanation of how a government of constitutional 
principle can yield, as it has, successive differing (and contradictory) answers 
to questions of policy, one of which by definition violates a constitutional 
interpretation derived from a principle that, by extension, must also to some 
extent violate that principle. 1 should like to explore how it is possible 
to provide two (or maybe more) conflicting interpretations of principles 
that themselves claim to have some meaning and also claim to be fixed, 
in some sense eternal and deriving legitimacy in government from this 
claim by returning to the model of the harmonious yet conflicting principles. 
   Let me give two examples of such conflict. The First is that of the 
conflict between the principle of freedom and that of equality with respect 
to property and the economic order. The second, that of the conflict
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between the principle of equality and that of the rule of law, with a con-
sideration of the potential consequences of that conflict for the principle 
of freedom. 
                      IV 
   In the course of this century, but having strong roots in the last century, 
the principle of moral equality of all citizens took an a materialistic aspect. 
Equality was not longer exclusively understood to mean "equal before 
God", but came to mean equal in the senses associated with "equal protec-
tion", "equal opportunity" and a number of others that were given content 
by constitutional elaboration. Equal came to mean not only an equal claim 
to salvation in another world, the means of which should be protected by 
law in this world, but also a collectivistic view of social equality in which 
responsibility for material well-being of citizens was to be borne by collec-
tive arrangements. By definition, this state of affairs restricts individual 
liberty - what it does to corporate liberty is more complicated. 
   The historical account of the present Situation is, certainly, complex, 
and it is not my purpose here to give historical detail, however necessary 
such detail may be. 1 wich merely to assert that in the United States the 
present public policy has resulted in what is called a mixed economy. The 
present policy for the "management" of the economy has resulted in an 
extraordinary melange of arrangements that affect the regulation, control, 
allocation, and provision not only of good and Services, but also resources. 
The present economy - one where half of all federal expenditure consists 
of benefits to individuals, and for two-thirds of those benefits, the financial 
need of the recipient is not a factor - has become the amalgamation 
stemming from the attenuation of private ownership of property through 
the public management of property and from the imposition of tax an 
incomes. That is, the way to achieve the principle of moral equality in a 
meaningful, material way has been to impose quasi-collectivization an 
what were formerly private property arrangements. The way to fulfill 
the principle of equality was through the imposition of legal arrangements 
that resulted in governmental control over resources, because such control 
was believed to be the means to solve the problems that beset mankind. 
What used to be called "public ownership" has been converted to some
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degree to "social ownership." The notions of "accountability" and "dis-
closure" have played a large role in fashioning this approach to equality. 
So have certain social movements, prominent among them that of "environ-
mentalists" and "ecologists", who have held that the maintenance of the 
environment is the responsibility of the collectivity, because the private 
management of a collective good was held to be insufficient in light of the 
given evidence. This means that there has arisen in law a new understanding 
with respect to the use of property. This new understanding has converted 
to some degree a law that had at one time very strong arrangements for 
the protection of private property. In some ways, the common law as it 
emerged at the end of seventeenth century and was taken up by the United 
States was a law of real property. That this is no longer as much so is 
because private property was antagonistic to the principle of equality in 
its new "social" manifestation, even if it was friendly to the competing 
principle of individual liberty. 
   The present political situation in the United States attests to the fierce-
ness of this competition. The debate over taxes versus the budgetary deficit, 
indeed the immediate discussion over the next majority leader in the United 
States Senate are in some measure sub-conflicts of this larger competition 
of constitutional principles. 
   In the second example 1 propose to consider the conflict between the 
principle of equality and that of the rule of law, and the potential consequ-
ences of that conflict for the ideal of freedom. 
   The rule of law is the limitation of government by law. It is the limi-
tation by law of the discretion of the executive in the exercise of power over 
the citizen; it is also the limitation of the legislative branch by constitution 
and custom, by tradition and morals. The limitation of the executive to 
the law passed by the legislative and adjudged by the judicial entails, at 
once, the separation of powers. The rule of law is infringed when any one 
of the instances involved abdicates its autonomous function within the 
total system of authority or seeks so to expand it that it compromises the 
autonomy of another function of government. A bureaucracy which acts 
without reference to law infringes an the rule of law as much as an a 
legislature which seeks to dominate the decisions of the judiciary. A legis-
lative body which abandons its responsibilities to the populace which has 
elected it diverges from the rufe of law as much as does a legislative body
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which renounces its constitutional powern to the executive. 
  The rule of law rests at bottom an the beliefwidely and deeply diffused 
throughout the society that there is an intrinsically sacred element in the 
law as such. The law, if the rule of law as a principle of constitutional 
government is to exist, must be though to be legitimate. The lawfulness 
of the law, its legitimacy, must be generally accepted. 
   This presents us with a difficulty. The principle of liberty, which in-
cludes the freedom to criticize and to suggest change, is affronted by the 
notion of the sacred that fixes the law and obstructs its change. Modern 
liberalism insists that no law should be so secure that no one can ever discuss 
it or challenge it, but it also acknowledges that some laws ought to be more 
secure and less changeable than others. Laws, by virtue of being law, should 
be thought to have an inherent, even if only temporary, validity. 
   Law is made by legislators, who, to become legislators, must also be, 
first, politicians. Politics is necessarily sectional; it always involves the quest 
of the advantage of some group, class, interest, region, coalition, etc., but 
above all the advantage of the party itself. Politics centers about divergent 
interpretations of the common good, because it involves the polemical 
espousal of the party's own interpretation of what is good. 
   These divergent interpretations, once brought into the realm of practical 
politics which seek the advantage of some over others, create a source of 
strain in any democratic system, the very constitution of which comprises 
some measure of dissensus. Where free discussion and criticism of the 
laws are possible, the preservation of fundamental agreement an certain 
Standards and rules may be difficult. 
  Thus, while the institution of criticism and the competition of parties 
are forces engendered by the nature of the system in which the three princi-
ples of the constitutional order exist, these forces are potentially injurious 
to the rule of law, and more so than to the other two principles. There are, 
however, situations which might endanger the rule of law as a principle 
more seriously which arise from the accentuation of the principle of equality 
if it has the practical effect of enhancing political populism. These situa-
tions are intimately bound with the interpretation of the Constitution 
and the formation and administration of public policy. 
   1 do not mean populism in the Sense of radical rural progressivism. 
1 mean it as a much broader political current, rather, especially prominent
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in the United States historically and recently, in which the "will of the 
people" becomes identified with justice and morality. This is so because 
populism proclaimed that the will of the people as such is supreme over 
every other standard. Populism contains, therefore, the belief that the 
people are not just equal to their rulers; they are actually better than their 
rulers. 
   The mere fact of popular preference is regarded as all-determining. 
Emanation from the people confers validity an a policy or an the value 
underlying it or both. Populism does not deny ethical standards or objective 
validity, but it discovers them in the preferences of the people. The belief 
in the intrinsic and immediate validity of the popular will has direct impli-
cations for the rule of law as a principle of constitutional government. 
For one thing, it denies autonomy to the legislative branch of government. 
It favors "responsive" government over a "government of leadership." 
Populism demands that all institutions of govemment be permeated by 
the popular will or responsive to it - since the validity of the popular 
will is self-evident. 
   In recent times the effect of populism an the executive branch of govern-
ment can be even more pronounced. Because of the vast discretionary 
and administrative authority that has become vested in the executive depart-
ment, its responsiveness to the popular will can be swifter and its effect 
an the public policy quite sweeping. One has only to look at the growth 
of the quantity of executive orders since 1936 to see this. The Pattern 
of the growth of executive orders is quite similar to that of overruling 
decisions. Franklin Roosevelt, after the failure of the court-packing plan, 
elevated the executive order to a new status of authority, and used it, more 
or less, to implement the Second New Deal. Lyndon Johnson, likewise, 
used the executive order for the conduct of the Vietnam conflict. For 
better or worse, these actions were to some degree an abrogation of earlier 
established constitutional arrangements. 
  Populistic politicians are preoccupied with opinion. They wish to 
conform to what appears to them to be dominant in the Body of popular 
opinion. This principle of populism, in which the dominant opinion reigns 
is to some degree the condition of modern government, and to that degree 
it contravenes the principle of the rule of law, because it expresses a funda-
mental moralistic attitude that cannot tolerate ideological heterogeneity.
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It is likewise suspicious of defined jurisdictions and institutional autonomy. 
   The principle of the rule of law is damaged when politiciansand legis-
lators abdicate or cede some of their institutional responsibilities to others, 
who, to gratify their desire for the approval of the popular will undercut 
the Separation of powers and create policies especially suited for the interest 
of the popular will. Such conduct is a renunciation of the principle of the 
supremacy of law to an unrepresentative popular will. The populist politi-
cian's fear of misapprehending the will of the people guides him in his 
policy decisions and leads to a distored and extreme elaboration of the 
principle of equality in the formation of policy. But deformed though this 
is, this tendency - in which egalitarianism is exaggerated so far as to 
become an inverted inegalitarianism - is a forceful and recurrent part 
of American constitutionalism. In this Sense the populistic tendency to 
hyperdemocracy through the extension of equality exerts force an all 
three of the fundamental principles of American constitutionalism as well 
as an the practical formulation of policy. The roots of this tendency lie 
in the distrust of politics as a legitimate activity and favor, thereby, the 
correction of politics by judicial action. Since the popular will is changing 
and changeable, "responsive" judicial action may be seen as following the 
popular will. Neither the tendency to hyperdemocracy nor the distrust 
of politics can be said to serve the principle of the rule of law, but both 
may help to understand why it is possible for a constitutional government 
of principle to provide contradictory responses to policy questions, while 
deriving the rationale for those responses from the same principle. 
V 
   The firnt part of this discussion sought to provide a way to understand 
some part of the extremely variable modern constitutional law in the United 
States. 1 should like to explore now in a much more tentative and specu-
lative way some of the implications of a law of constitutional principles 
that has become increasingly transformable (transformable here in the 
sense that it can overrule itself) in the light of expediential considerations, 
a law in which sociological, economic, and new ethical arguments have taken 
the place of older legal concepts and impaired to some degree the precision 
of juristic logic, while perhaps simultaneously providing a greater measure
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of justice. 
   One of the most striking features of modern law in contrast to that 
of the last half of the 19th century has been the emergence of new sources 
of law, law in which "social factors", understood in a new way, have come 
to plag a dominant role in the making of new law. Modern social develop-
ment has given rise to a series of factors, apart from the political and internal 
professional motives of legal practitioners, that has weakened the older 
forms of legal formal rationalism. 
   The modern theory of legal sources has focused an the contemporary 
force of a statute or other piece of law by freeing law from the original 
intent of the "legislative will" that could be discovered through the study 
of the legislative history of an enactment and by disintegrating the old force 
of "customary law", which had acted as a source of legislative and judicial 
restraint. By so doing the new theory of legal sources that sees a statute 
in some sense as "atemporal" and subject to interpretation in the light 
of "social factors" has opened a way to the free balancing of values and 
interests in each individual case, which has in turn created a body of law 
that is asymmetric to other related bodies of law - as in the matter of 
judicial overrulings. 
   The course of modern constitutional interpretation has systematically 
opened the way for other systems of value to become incorporated into 
judicial decision. The findings of social science firnt found a place in Muller 
vs. Oregon, but they were almost co-etaneous with economic policy that 
found fault with monopoly and later concentration. Perhaps the most 
powerful engine for the introduction of extra-legal values into the law was 
the growth of legal Realism and the belief that "empirical investigation" 
accompanied by a recognition of the "true facts" would offer a happy 
solution to the perceived shortcoming of judicial decisions influenced by 
the conceptual apparatus of the law. Indeed the attack an conceptual law 
was accompanied by one an historical jurispudence that weakened the 
basis of judicial decision derived from the way things had been. Since 
this attack an the historical past sought to show that things had not been 
as the historical jurisprudents asserted, the way was opened - a vacuum 
was created, so to speak - for the introduction of sources of values 
outside of the law into the law. 
   By discrediting the old Synthesis of the conceptual apparatus and the
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Basis for law that historical jurisprudence provided, the Realist-reformers 
also made it easier for lawyers to revise common law doctrines an a piece-
meal basis in ways that might accommodate half-formed intuitions about the 
meaning of the new regime that resulted in the New Deal. Since traditional 
doctrines were now demoted to the status of working rules, it became 
easier to supplement, modify, and transform them whenever a Realist sense 
of situational justice required it. Thus the consideration doctrine came to 
sit, if uncomfortably, with new ideas of unconscionability: negligence, 
with strict liability. The multiplication of such dissonances was an occasion 
not for anxiety but for proud recognition of the capacity of the common 
law under the Banner of Realist reform, to adapt pragmatically to the 
political repudiation of its laissez faire past. The emerging pattern of 
common law discourse came to resemble the new administrative discourse 
that had overwhelmed it. In both public and private domains, lawyers 
would learn to look upon organizing abstractions - be they "contract" 
or the "public convenience and necessity" - with considerable skepticism. 
The life of the law was to be found in the sensitive formation of highly 
particularistic rules, and in the Realist refusal to generalize those rules 
beyond the particular contexts that gave them meaning. 
   It was the "statement of the facts" by the Realist lawyers that provided 
the route to challenge what they had asserted. This has been done by a 
number of thinkers, but perhaps the most influential have been, in the 
near term, the economist-lawyers who have extended the paradigm of 
Ronald Coase's The Problems of Social Cost. In this formulation of a 
classic struggle between the farmers and the ranchers, Coase posits "zero 
transaction costs" which holds that both parties to the complaint were in 
perfect positions to predict the future consequences of their actions at 
a time at which they could have made cost-minimizing adjustments in 
their courses of conduct. 
   The Coasean transformation of tort law is not only important in itself; 
it is also symptomatic of a larger effort by lawyers to reconstruct their 
understanding of the "facts" throughout the length and breadth of the 
legal culture. This new form of factual analysis, moreover, provides a 
powerful impetus for legal generalizations of a kind quite different from 
our Realist predecessors. As the Coasean lawyer, given to complexity, 
states his version of the facts in more and more cases, it becomes ever
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clearer that different branches of the law treat similar market failures in 
very different ways. "Nuisance," "products liability," and "fault", for 
example, now seem different common law labels for handling a complex 
set of interrelated problems organized by the existence of a complex variety 
of externalities and related market failures. Since lawyers are taught that 
like cases should be treated alike, this perception of factual similarity 
generates a cognitive drive for a new synthesis. Should not the law be 
reconstructed to deal responsively with the facts that the new analysis 
has come to reveal? 
   This question applies with even greater force to the disordered heap 
of statutory law that dominates today's legal landscape. While the previous 
generation could see little beyond a mass of particular statutory formulas 
disguising enormous administrative discretion, Coasean lawyers are quick 
to find that their understanding of market failure permits them a view, 
quite new, of the statutory terrain. Vast forests of legal detail can be 
reduced to manageable categories as soon as they are seen as efforts to 
co-ordinate a series of interrelated market failures. The ground is being 
prepared in short for a disciplined effort to compare and assess a broad 
range of responses to market failure in terms of common legal language. 
This major overhaul of tort law, stemming from a new way to see the facts, 
rests an the belief that certain economic values such as "efiiciency" and 
"maximization" have applicability and relevance to the law. Perhaps 
economics is the most significant source for a change in the theory of legal 
sources, but it is not the only one. And all of the changes, despite their 
separate intellectual claims for validity, have a common root in modern 
politics. 
                      VI 
   Since we live in a politically guaranteed legal order, the legal order 
reflects some of the vicissitudes of politics as well as responds to them. 
Not only must the law respond to political forces for substantive justice 
by being a balancer of interests, a calmer of claims, according to the values 
inherent in the new legal sources, but also the law must respond to the 
tendencies inherent in certain forms of political authority, either of authori-
tarian or of democratic character, concerning the ends of law which are
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respectively appropriate to those forms of political authority. A most 
important aspect of the modern forms of political authority has been the 
rise of and increase in governmental administrative authority to "manage" 
the state. Bureaucratic authority is the authority of imposed regulation and 
discretion, and by definition discretion is arbitrary, which places it outside 
the ambit of the principle of the rule of law. 
   Moreover, the United States Constitution is an instrument fashioned 
for a republican form of political authority - which was understood to 
be something quite different from a democratic form. So, as the political 
structure of the United States has changed in recent years, becoming in-
creasingly "democratized", in its claims as least, the constitutional law has 
been changed in ways thought to be more appropriate to this form of 
political authority. A feature of government that is more important in 
democratic forms of authority than in republican ones is increased emphasis 
an equality, especially "economic" and "social" equality rather than 
"political" equality. This emphasis coupled with the substantive claims 
of law for the balancing of interests has led to the "administration of 
equality," which however imperfectly achieved, has resulted in much greater 
administrative and discretionary authority than was previously the Gase. 
   From this situation have come two developments that are significant 
for the principles of constitutional government in the United States and 
for the construction of its public policy. One, as 1 have already suggested, 
is the difficuity of confronting the principle of the rule of law with dis-
cretionary authority, an authority the exercise of which in time will pose 
difficulties for the other two broad principles as well. It is very hard to 
find evidence that might contravene this indication. 
   The second development is concerned with the administrative domi-
nation that has come from the increase in state power. This domination 
is the result of expanded intrusion into areas that come from the confusion 
of the tenets of public policy, making the foundations of that policy much 
harder to discern, to understand, and to judge. When a political order of 
constitutional principles rubs or smears those principles into indiscernible 
shapes, it must be minimally recognized that a legal order has changed in 
ways that defy the original claims of that order. 
   Something of this nature has happened to the United States Constitu-
tion. And whatever one makes of this change, it has provided us anew with
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the opportunity to examine an important aspect of the problem about 
the ends and claims of law: is a constitutionally governed system of law 
to balance class interests and social ideologies and to respond to changes 
in forms of political authority, or is it to provide political freedom through 
the limitation of the power of government? If the answer is affirmative 
to the first part of that question, if the constitutional system is to balance 
and to respond, than it would be worthwhile for us to examine the impli-
cations of the decline of a garantiste variety of constitution, implications 
not only for constitutional law but also for the conduct of public policy 
- and perhaps much else besides.
